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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO. 15408

MARK LESLIE LARSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in the Fourth Judicial District
Court upon an information alleging a violation of the provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, § 76-5-207 in that " .•. on or
about the 19th day of June, A.D., 1976, at Utah County, State
of Utah, the said Mark Leslie Larsen, while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, to a degree rendering him incapable of
safely driving a motor vehicle, did while operating a motor
vehicle in a negligent manner, cause the death of Baby Mlejnek."
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to a jury, the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen, District Judge, presiding.
returned by the jury.

Defendant was sentenced to serve an

indeterminate term not to exceed five
State Prison.

A verdict of guilty was

(5) years in the Utah
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Execution of the sentence was stayed and defendant placed
on probation upon the condition that he serve six

(6) months

in the Utah County Jail and pay a fine of $1,000.00.

Defendant

was represented at trial by Richard 11. Taylor, Attorney at Law,
who withdrew following the conclusion of the proceedings.

De fen-

dant's present counsel has been appointed by the Utah State
Supreme Court to pursue this matter on appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction or failing that,
a new trial.
STATE!1ENT OF THE FACTS
Evidence presented at trial by the State indicated that the
defendant was being pursued by a sheriff's deputy on I-15 southbound in Utah County at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour,
(R.ll), and that the defendant's vehicle and another containing
Andrew Mlejnek, his wife Sandra, and their two children apparently
collided (R.l2).

There were injuries to the four occupants of the

Mlejnek vehicle but no fatalities

(R.25).

At the time of the

accident, Sandra Mlejnek was in her 26th week of pregnancy (R.67).
Sandra Mlejnek testified that she felt movement of the fetus on
the day the accident occured, but not after the accident (R.36,37•
Dr. Lynn Dayton, a certified synapsatrician gynecologist,
testified that on the 19th day of June, 1976, he examined Sandra
Mlejnek to determine whether or not the fetus was alive (R.66).
During that examination, he was unable to detect any heart tones
or other fetal activity.

A few days later, labor

~as

induced

and Mrs. Mlejnek delivered a stillborn fetus wPiqhing approximate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one and one-half pounds.

Dr. Dayton further testified that in

his opinion, a traumatic blow could have been the cause of
death of the infant, and that based on the statement of Sandra
Mlejnek that the fetus was viable up to the time of the accident.
(R. 70).
Dr. Dayton also testified that the word "viable" means that
the baby was alive within the mother (R.70).

He further testi-

fied that a fetus of the size delivered by Mrs. Mlejnek would
have approximately a 25 percent chance of survival outside the
uterus

(R.72).

A breathalizer test conducted on defendant indicated his
blood alcohol level to be .13 at the time it was taken (R. 55).
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the State had failed to prove a
prima facie case since a fetus was not "another" as used in the
statute under which defendant was charged
court denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss

(R.74).

The trial

(R.78).

The defendant took exception to Instruction No. 5 and Instruction No. 11.

(R.79).
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

DEFENDANT DID NOT cmtHIT THE CRU\E CHARGED IN THE INFORHATION SINCE A VIABLE FETUS IS NOT "ANOTHER" AS USED IN UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953) SECTION 76-5-207.
Utah has

abolished common law crimes, therefore only acts

designated by the legislature are criminal. U.C.A. ~::.953) Section
Sponsored by theprovides:
S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
76-l-105
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-3OCR, may contain errors.

"CamDn law crimes are abolished and no conduct
is a cri..rre unless made so by this code, other
applicable statute or ordinance."
The Utah State Legislature has not included unborn fetuses
within the class of those who may be victims of a crime.
Code Annotated

(1953) Section 76-5-207

Utah

(l) provides:

"Criminal hcxnicide constitutes aut0110bile homicide
if the actor, while under the influence of intoxieating liquor, a controlled substance, or any drug,
to a degree which renders the actor incapable of
safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another
by operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner."
(Emphasis added)
The word "another" used in the statute is used in reference
to the word "actor" used in the preceeding portion of the statute.
U.C.A.

(1953)

Sect~on

76-l-601 defines those terms as follows:

"(3)

"Actor" m2ans a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action ...

(4)

"Person" means an irrlividual, public or private
corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association."

Where the legislature has intended to broaden the meaning
of a term they have done so expressly in the definitional section.
An example is the term "person".

The legislature has expanded

the normal meaning of the term to include incorporatlons, partnerships and associations.
Websters New Word Dictionary defines the term "person" as
follows:
"person.

l. a human being

2.

the human body

3.

person-

ality;
self."
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The foregoing terms are not normally used in reference to
an unborn child.
At common law and in the absence of statute, it is generally held that the terms "person", "human being", etc. do not
include an unborn fetus.

In order for an infant to be victim

of a homicide, the child must have heen born alive.
"At cc:mron law and in the absence of statute, it is the
rule that i f a child dies before birth, no crime is
predicable of the act causing its death, but if it is
born alive and thereafter dies from the effects of the
defendant's felonious act, the culpability is tiE same
as that in=red in killing any other human being, even
though the act eventually resulting in its death occured
before delivery. The element essential to culpability in
this case seems to be the independant existence of the
infant. If tiE child can be said to have had an in:iependant existence, the act of killing, it will be murder or
mmslaughter; otherwise it will not."
40 Am Jur 2nd Homicide, p. 300.
The California Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether or not the term "human being" as used in the California
homicide statute included a "viable unborn fetus".

In Keeler v.

Superior Court, 2 Cal 3d 619, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P 2d 617,
40 ALR 3d 420, the defendant had beaten his pregnant estranged
wife in an effort to "stomp the baby out of her".
section was performed.

The fetus was stillborn.

A Caesarian
The pathologist

testified that the cause of death was skull fracture from the
beating of the mother.

Further, there was testimony that there

was "reasonable medical certainty" that the fetus had developed
to the stage of viability and that if the child had been delivered
on the date of the beating it would have had a 75 to 95 percent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chance of survival.

The court in Keeler

(supra) found that

the term "human being" used in the California statute did not
include a viable but unborn fetus.

The California legislature

has since passed a feticide statute.
The Supreme Court of Ohio was presented almost precisely
the same issue which is presented by the present case in State v.
Dickenson, 28 Ohio St. 2nd 65, 275 NE 2nd 599.

Dickenson was

charged under the Ohio vehicle homicide statute with causing the
death of a seven month fetus aborted by the mother as a result
of injuries sustained during the accident.

The fetus was still-

born and an autopsy indicated that death was due to injuries
sustained as a result of the traffic accident.

The section of

Revised Code of Ohio under which the defendant was charged,
§

4511.181 provides in part:
"No person shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause

the death of another while violating section 4511.19
of the Revised Ccx:le. Any person violating this section
is guilty of hanicide by vehicle in the first degree."
The court in Dickenson

(supra) held that the word "another'

as used in the Ohio vehicle homicide statute did not include a
viable fetus upon the ground that the common law had required
that the child be born alive before it could be the victim of a
homicide.

The court further indicated that the Ohio General

Assembly had had numerous opportunities to amend the statute but
had never chosen to expand or change the meaning of the term
"person" or had never inacted a feticide statute.
The foregoing cases are not isolated decisions.

Many

courts have found that an unborn viable fetus cannot be the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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victim of a homicide where the homicide statute uses terms such
as "human being" or "person" to describe the victim.
in State v. Gyles

(La)

For example,

313 So 2nd 799, the court held that where

defendant struck a pregnant woman which resulted in the delivery
of a stillborn child he could not be convicted of the statutory
crime of murder where the statute required the killing of a
human being.

In Kihner v. Hicks

court held that wrongful

~eath

(Ariz 1975) 529 p 2d 706, the

statutes providing for damages

when "death of a person is caused by wrongful act" did not
include viable fetus.

See also Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.

2nd 4, and Justiss v. Atchison, 139 Cal. Rptr.

97, 565 P 2d 122

(1977).
The trial court therefore should have granted defendant's
Motion to Dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case.
POINT II
THE JUDICIAL ENLARGEMENT OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953)
76-5-207 BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTES AN EX POST FACTO LAW
IN THAT THE DEFENDANT DID HOT RECEIVE FAIR NOTICE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF HIS CONDUCT.
Defense counsel moved to dismiss upon the grounds that the
State failed to prove a prima facie case since Utah Code Annotated
Section 76-5-207 did not include unborn fetuses

(R.74).

The

trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss indicating that the
question was a jury question in that the death of the fetus should
be treated the same as if a living person had been killed

(R.76,77).

The court then instructed the jury on the theory tl.~t a fetus
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could be the victim of a vehicle homicide.
Instruction No.

5 provided:

"The essential elements of the crime charged in the information is as follows:
1.

That the defendant while operating an
automobile on a public street or highway killed one, Baby Mlejnek.

2.

That the defendant at such time was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor to a
degree which rendered him incapable of
safely driving a vehicle.

3.

That the defendant operated his autarobile in a negligent manner.

4.

That the death of the said Baby Mlejnek was
the proximate result of the negligence, if
any, of the defendant.

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a
reasonable doubt any one or more of the above essential elements
of the crime charged, you should acxruit the defendant. But if
the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the elements of the offense as above set forth,
the defendant is guilty of the offense charged in the Informa-

tion .... "
Further,

Instruct"ion No.

11 provided:

"The first elC'nu.t of Instruction No. 5 requires that
you find the del2!1dant killed one Baby r1lejnek. In
order for you tu do so, you must determine that the
said Baby MlejJtck was a viable human being.
"Viability" is defined as having attained such form
and develop1n11 of organs as would be normally capable
of living out;;Jde the uterus."
Defense counsel look exception to both of the foregoing
instructions

(R. 79).

The findings of til·· lower court that a viable fetus could br
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the victim of a homicide constitutes a judicial enlargement of
U.C.A. Section 76-5-207 which was not forseeable by the defendant.

The United States Supreme Court in ~B~o~u~i~e____v~·~~C~i~t~y~o~f

Columbia,

(1964)

378 U.S.

347, 12 L Ed 2nd 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697,

held such judicial enlargements to be "unforseeable" and that the
retroactive application of a criminal statute so enlarged is a
denial of due process of law in that the defenoant has no fair
warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime.
also Connaly v. General Construction Co., 269

u.s.

See

385, 70 LEd

322, 46 S. Ct. 126.
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah State Constitution expressly forbids the passage of any ex post facto laws.
Such a judicial enlargement also contravenes Utah Code
Annotated,

(1953) Section 76-1-104 which provides:
"The provisions of this cxxl.e shall be =nstrued in
accordance with these general principles:
(1)

Forbid and prevent the emmission of
offenses;

(2)

Defi,,~ adequately th2 =ncluct and
ment., L state which constitute each
offe113e and safeguard conduct that
is without fault from condemnation

as c~_Lminal ..... "

If the provisions and definitions enacted by the legislature
require additional definition by the judiciary, then it would
seem to follow that the statute or statutes in question do not

give the defendant fair notice that his conduct subjected him to
criminal sanctions.
be reversed.

Tl1•,refore, the defendants conviction should
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POINT III
ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT IN RULING
THAT A VIABLE FETUS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A VEHICLE HOMICIDE,
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH, IF BELIEVED,
REASONABLE MINDS COULD HAVE FOUND THE FETUS TO HAVE BEEN VIABLE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
The State's medical expert, Dr. Lynn Dayton, testified on
direct examination that he assumed the fetus was viable up to
the point of the accident (R.70).

Upon cross-examination he

stated that by "viability" he meant that the baby was alive
within the mother

(R.70).

The doctor indicated that a baby born

at the stage of development existing at twenty-six weeks of
gestation statistically does not have a good chance of survival.
(R.7l).

Further, Dr. Dayton estimated the baby's chances of sur-

vival at only twenty-five percent (25%) had the child been born
under normal circumstances.

(R.72).

The record contains no

additional testimony concerning viability of the fetus save that
of Dr. Dayton.

It is difficult to perceive how reasonable minds

could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the fetus was viable
within the confines of Instruction No. ll cited previously.

Ther~

fore, the conviction of defendant should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
~

Appellant submits that the Trial Court should have granted
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss since the Utah State Legislature
has not included an unborn viable fetus within the class of
persons who may be victims of homicide.
Further, that since there arc no statutory definitions
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nor cases which have previously defined the conduct of the
Appellant as criminal, any judicial enlargement of U.C.A. (1953)
Section 76-5-207 would not give Appellant the fair notice required by the United States Constitution and the Utah State
Constitution and would operate as an ex post facto law as
applied to Appellant.
Finally, it is respectfully submitted that there was not
sufficient e\idence of viability upon which reasonable minds
could find that issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upon such basis, the Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction, or failing that, a new trial.

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Utah County Legal Defender Assoc.
107 East 100 South, # 29
Pro""• UT
84601
nttorney for Appellant

-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

